

[03/25/2025]

Re: Public Records Request

Dear Ray Lutz,

Thank you for contacting the Office of the Secretary of State ("SOS") to submit a public records request. This request seeks the following specific records/information regarding the Risk Limiting Audit for the 2024 General Election:

- 1. Did they include all ballots, including DRE VVPAT printouts in the RLA audit?
 - Risk-Limiting Audits are conducted pursuant to <u>NRS 293.394</u>, <u>NAC 293.481</u>, and <u>NAC 293.485</u>. Each county audits the paper ballots within their jurisdiction. For a full video and training for risk-limiting audits, please visit <u>https://docs.voting.works/arlo</u>
- 2. How were the ballots accessed? Did the counties send in the ballots, or did they just report what was on them?
 - Explain the process. Is there any written procedures for the exact process used? Please provide if so.
 - Each county audits the paper ballots within their jurisdiction. For a full video and training for risk-limiting audits, please visit <u>https://docs.voting.works/arlo</u>
- 3. Do all counties imprint the number on scans of mail-in ballots? How can we be sure they chose the ballots that were randomly selected using the random seed? (It is an easy way to thwart an RLA audit so it will never find anything by simply choosing ballots that agree with the result.)
 - Our audits are conducted using Arlo- Voting Works. While the Secretary of State's (SOS) office administers the audit, each county conducts the audit from their offices. After each county uploads the required files necessary. The SOS will select the pseudorandom seed and launch the audit. Arlo – Voting Works then assigns the ballots that needs to be audited. Each county must

NEVADA STATE CAPITOL 101 N. Carson Street, Suite 3 Carson City, Nevada 89701-3714 PAUL LAXALT BUILDING COMMERCIAL RECORDINGS 401 N. Carson Street Carson City, Nevada 89701-4201 LAS VEGAS OFFICE 2250 Las Vegas Blvd North, Suite 400 North Las Vegas, Nevada 89030-5873 **STATE OF NEVADA CAMPUS** 1 State of Nevada Way, 3rd Floor Las Vegas, Nevada 89119-4339

nvsos.gov

be organized. If they do not use an imprint ID on their ballots, they must be able to locate the correct ballot by their organization protocols. <u>https://docs.voting.works/arlo</u>

- 4. Were there any corrections made if discrepancies were detected? What was the process for any discrepancies. You reported no discrepancies, but that is almost too good to be true. There usually are some minor discrepancies in hand-marked paper ballots.
 - Our State had zero (0) discrepancies. This means the votes entered during the audit matched that of the votes counted during the election with 100% accuracy.
- 5. Were all contests on each ballot gathered in the process, and discrepancies noted? (or only the targeted contests)?
 - The statewide audit was conducted using the two targeted contests and one opportunistic contest for each county. No discrepancies were noted.
- 6. Were the votes on the ballots entered on paper-based tally sheets, or were they entered directly into a DRE-like interface, with no paper trail?
 - The audit was conducted and entered using Arlo-Voting Works audit system
- 7. Were the risks levels achieved also calculated for other contests (that were not targeted)? Were the risks achieved calculated for those local "opportunistic contests"?
 - Yes, the risk limit-audit conducted included both targeted and opportunistic contests for all counties across the state.
- 8. How were the contests "randomly" selected, and when.
 - The full list of judicial and non-judicial candidates for statewide offices are assigned numbers 1 through X until all candidates have an assigned number. The website random.org is used to determine the statewide candidate to be selected and whichever office that candidate is running for will be the race used for the RLA.
- 9. Were the counties notified of the targeted contests prior to providing ballot data?
 - If you have any additional procedures, reports, tally sheets, ballot images, etc. that document the RLA process, then please provide those.
 - Yes, pursuant to NRS 293.394 the counties were notified of the targeted contests prior to the audit.

- 10. Question not on RLA: Do the Dominion machines as used in Clark County for inperson voting generate a printed report that provides the aggregated totals from that machine? Some people call these the poll-tape reports. Are these scanned and posted for the public to review?
 - 15 counties in Nevada use Dominion Voting Machines: Churchill, Clark, Douglas, Elko, Esmeralda, Eureka, Humboldt, Lincoln, Lyon, Mineral, Nye, Pershing, Storey, Washoe and White Pine counties.
 - None of the counties generate "poll-tape reports," or printed, aggregated totals of votes cast on machines.
 - More information on voting systems can be found here.
- 11. Are ballot images routinely posted as they are in other states, such as Georgia?
 - No counties in Nevada publish ballot images.

Please see the attached additional records regarding the Risk Limiting Audit.

Thank you for contacting the Office of the Secretary of State.

Sincerely,

The Office of the Secretary of State