Citizens’ Oversight
Projects (COPs)

CitizensOversight.org

1265 Avocado Blvd, Suite 104 (PMB 335)
El Cajon, CA 92020
619-820-5321

February 12, 2009

Deborah Seiler
San Diego County Registrar of Voters
P.O. Box 85656
San Diego, CA. 92186-5656 
(858) 565-5800                                                                                      THIS DOCUMENT: C00021

CC: CAO Walter Ekard, Sup. Dianne Jacob, Secretary of State Debra Bowen, and Miguel Castillo, Legal unit, California Secretary of State, Kirsten Clemons, District Director for Assemblymember Lori Saldana.

Dear Ms. Seiler:

This (C00021)  is a follow-up communication responding to your response to C00017 (2008-12-02) and C00019 (2009-01-08). This is essentially a simplified version of C00019 without request information if the item is closed (saving 6 pages), plus one new item (#24). We would appreciate improved processing of our request to reduce the delay in completing our review.

We will explicitly close any of the questions that you have answered, and will continue to use the same numbering system for any new questions either to clarify any confusion in our earlier written questions or to get more thorough understanding of what you are doing.

 1 	We have received during our meeting the document entitled “Results of the 1% Manual Tally for the 6/3/2008 Direct Primary Election” in response to our request of Nov. 20. However, the heading on the letter states “REGISTRAR OF VOTERS ELECTION SERVICES DIVISION INTRA-DEPARTMENTAL MEMO DRAFT.” The document appears to be a DRAFT, and only for Intra (within) department circulation. 
 1.1 	CLOSED.
 1.2 	Our conversation with the Secretary of State confirmed that their web site may not be updated with all the reports from the counties, even though they may have received them. 
Q: Was this report transmitted to the Secretary of State? (If not, perhaps it should be!)
 1.2.1 	ROV (C00017) It will be submitted to the Secretary of State's office for display on its website along with our report on the November election.
 1.2.2 	 FOLLOW-UP (OPEN) -  Your answer was not explicit, but implied that the report was not submitted to the Secretary of State. Please answer the question: Was this report transmitted to the Secretary of State in a timely manner? Our 1% Manual Tally Reports for the February, June, and November elections were submitted timely to the Secretary of State.

 2 	CLOSED.

 3 	 CLOSED.

 4 	CLOSED

 5 	CLOSED

 6 	CLOSED.

 7 	Spoiled return. If the voter checks the “Spoiled” box, a new ballot is issued by RoV staff.
 7.1 	What records are kept?
The spoiled ballot is suspended.  The second ballot is sent to the voter and a note is made on the voter’s record on our election management system.
 7.1.1 	ROV: Answer: We do not have a box on mail ballot envelopes to indicate "Soiled"
 7.1.2 	 FOLLOWUP: According to California Election Code, section 2300:

2300.  ...There shall be a Voter Bill of Rights for voters, available to the public, which shall read:
 (1) (A) You have the right to cast a ballot if you are a valid registered voter.
 (B) A valid registered voter means a United States citizen who is a resident in this state, who is at least 18 years of age and not in prison or on parole for conviction of a felony, and who is registered to vote at his or her current residence address.
 (2) You have the right to cast a provisional ballot if your name is not listed on the voting rolls.
 (3) You have the right to cast a ballot if you are present and in line at the polling place prior to the close of the polls.
 (4) You have the right to cast a secret ballot free from intimidation.
 (5) (A) You have the right to receive a new ballot if, prior to casting your ballot, you believe you made a mistake.
 (B) If at any time before you finally cast your ballot, you feel you have made a mistake, you have the right to exchange the spoiled ballot for a new ballot. Vote by mail voters may also request and receive a new ballot if they return their spoiled ballot to an elections official prior to the closing of the polls on election day.

I have submitted such a ballot envelope with a checkmark in a small box in the upper righthand corner, I believe in the 2006 election, so perhaps your procedures and forms have changed. You may have some other means for the voter to indicate that it is spoiled. (Sorry, I see that I wrote “Soiled” and not “Spoiled” in my earlier question, so I have changed the wording to avoid further confusion.) 

Q: Exactly what is the procedure for a voter to indicate that his ballot is spoiled and therefore to submit it to your office and get a replacement, including the records kept? The voter can return the ballot by mail by checking the “spoiled” box (as noted above), or the voter can call to report the spoilage.  In either event, the first ballot is suspended and a second is issued.  If the spoiled ballot is called in, the outgoing replacement ballot is stamped “2nd”. The voter must return a declaration with the ballot saying they did not vote twice. (Please also answer the following questions which were skipped in your previous response. These could have been answered even if there was no “Spoiled” checkbox on the form, and I have revised these questions to use the proper terminology of “Spoiled” instead of “soiled.”) (OPEN)

 7.2 	Are spoiled envelopes just disposed of, or are they kept? They are kept for the legally required retention period.
 7.3 	If a voter submits a “spoiled” ballot, but does not return an unspoiled ballot, are they contacted to see if their ballot was lost or stolen, or perhaps the prior envelope is fraudulently spoiled? No
 7.4 	Is it possible for compromised RoV staff to fraudulently spoil ballots to affect an election? No. RoV staff are not compromised, work under close supervision, and work in areas with video surveillance.
 7.5 	Is a signature required (and compared) to authenticate the act of spoiling a ballot? We do not signature check spoiled ballots.

 8 	Bad address return. If the Ballot was mailed to the voter and it was returned by USPS as unable to deliver
 8.1 	What records are updated?
 8.1.1 	ANSWER: After the election, these "undeliverables " are processed by sending another mailing to the voter. The creation of this mailer results in a notation to the voter's record on our election management system.
 8.1.2 	FOLLOWUP (OPEN): Your answer implies that no records are updated until after the election, but in the following question, you imply that the forwarding address would be honored. Can you please clarify: is it possible that the voter's record is updated prior to the end of the election or are all such records not updated until after the election. Please feel free to describe this process in detail.  If the return address provided by the USPS is within the same home precinct, we suspend the ballot and send a ballot to the new address.  If the return address is not within the same home precinct, the voter’s record is updated after the election unless the voter contacts us to inquire, in which case we advise them to come to our office to vote.  If that voter voted at another precinct on Election Day, they would vote provisionally and the provisional ballot would be counted provided there is no indication the voter voted twice.
 8.2 	CLOSED.

 9 	CLOSED.

 10 	Envelope Processing Queue – Signature Verification. Envelopes are removed from the envelope processing queue in the order they were received and inspected (Responder's note: this is not necessarily the case.). . The signature on the envelope is compared with the signature from the Registration Form. The Voter Database is also checked to see that voter has not already voted at the precinct. (Responder's note: this is impossible for mail ballots processed prior to Election Day.)
 10.1 	CLOSED.
 10.2 	CLOSED.
 10.3 	CLOSED.
 10.4 	CLOSED.
 10.5 	CLOSED.
 10.6 	We stated that “envelopes are removed from the envelope processing queue in the order they were received and inspected” and you responded that “this is not necessarily the case.” Please explain what is the case. Is it that the envelopes are removed in batches and one may slightly be processed in advance of another, making it not absolutely (but nearly) a First-in-First-Out queue, or is there some other explanation? We are unclear what is meant here.  Upon second reading, we think you are asking if scanned envelopes are kept in order through the time the signatures are verified. At that point, the envelopes are processed in the order received.  (OPEN)

 11 	Signature Verification Success. Ballot is removed from the envelope and placed in a ballot “batch box.”
 11.1 	CLOSED.
 11.2 	Are ballots presorted by precinct as they are added to batch boxes?
 11.2.1 	Answer. No. The envelopes are sorted by precinct prior to the removal of the ballot.
 11.2.2 	FOLLOWUP (OPEN): To be clear, is the following description accurate?
a. envelope is received and placed into a reception bin of some kind. true
b. envelopes are scanned into the election management system and placed into a processing bin. First they’re screened for spoils and missing signatures; 
c. envelopes are then inspected and signature verified. true
d. envelopes are sorted into precincts. true
e. ballots are removed and placed into batch boxes, groups roughly by precinct.true

 11.3 	CLOSED.

 12 	Signature Verification Failure – If the signature is deemed not to match the signature on file,
 12.1 	Is the Voter Data record updated to note that the signature fails?
 12.1.1 	Answer: Yes.
 12.1.2 	FOLLOWUP: Is the fact that the signature failed available to the voter on the web site mentioned in answer 9.1.1? (OPEN) No.  The website just indicates whether the ballot was received.  The Rov hopes to be able to supply this information online in the future.
 12.2 	Is the voter contacted to submit another ballot or validate current ballot?
 12.2.1 	 Answer: No.
 12.2.2 	CLOSED.
 12.3 	Is voter contacted to submit a new signature?
 12.3.1 	Answer: Yes. The voter receives a letter and a new voter registration card.
 12.3.2 	FOLLOWUP: Please provide a copy of the letter sent to the voter.
 12.3.3 	ROV Sample of Letter provided in Email of 2009-02-04 
 12.3.4 	(CLOSED)
 12.4 	How many signatures comparisons failed in the Nov. 4, June 3, and Feb 8, 2008 Elections?
 12.4.1 	ANSWER: November 08: 1,639; June 08: 309; February 08: 688.
 12.4.2 	FOLLOWUP (OPEN): Total ballots in Nov. 2008 was 1,245,947 and 1,639 invalidated signatures was a 0.1315% reject rate.
Total ballots in June 2008 was 465,489 and 309 invalidated signatures was a 0.0663% reject rate.
Total ballots in Feb 2008 was 797,043 and 688 invalidated signatures was a 0.0863% reject rate.
Therefore, the rejection rate in November was approximately double the rate in the June election and 50% higher than the February election. Did the review process change to tighten the criteria for a match in the November election? We apologize.  The 1,639 number for November was the number isolated for questionable signature. However, of those, only 644 were actually invalidated after management  review-- which was .0011% of the mail ballots returned.

 12.5 	CLOSED.

 12.6 	(OPEN) The Franken vs. Coleman recount proceedings discovered some 1,600 vote-by-mail ballots that were incorrectly rejected due to “missing date.” However, the ruling in that case was that no ballot can be rejected solely because the date was not included. 
---> How many Vote-by-mail ballots were rejected because no date was included? The date is not relevant.  If a ballot is received on or before 8pm on Election Day, it is valid if otherwise correct (i.e., signed, etc.)

 13 	Batch Box Processing. After sufficient VBM ballots are processed, the filled batch box (about 750 ballots) is transported to scanner station for processing. 
 13.1 	CLOSED.
 13.2 	Is there a traveler that accompanies the batch box? Yes.
 13.2.1 	Answer: We are unclear what is meant by traveler.
 13.2.2 	FOLLOWUP (OPEN): A “Traveler” is “A term for a list and record of instructions that follows a part in a manufacturing process.” See http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/traveler. In this context, we mean a document that follows the batch box to allow operators to initial the completion of the box, timestamp, etc. and can be used to enact a rigorous custody regime. With that said, is there any such document that accompanies the batch box?. A document indicating the number of envelopes is created when the envelopes are scanned and it stays with the batch through the signature checking process. After sorting, we receive a report of the number of ballots scanned.
 13.3 	Is the number of ballots known either through counting as they are added to the box or through counting before scanning (such as by using a counting scale)?
 13.3.1 	Answer: The ballots are weighed to get an estimate as to the number of ballots in the box; this is accurate within 2 to 4 ballots.
 13.3.2 	FOLLOWUP (OPEN): Please provide the make and model of the scale(s) utilized for this measurement. Detecto #MS100

 14 	Scanning Process of Batch boxes.
 14.1 	CLOSED.
 14.2 	CLOSED.
 14.3 	CLOSED.
 14.4 	CLOSED.
 14.5 	CLOSED.
 14.6 	Is the ballot count provided by the a-priori tally compared with the count of ballots as scanned by the scanner?
 14.6.1 	Answer: There is no comparison,- however the scanner operator pre-counts the ballots as they run them. During counting they post the count as they go through the scanner. Example: Count 10 ballots, run these through the scanner and z1 the end 10 ballots will display on the scanner display, count another 10 and scan these and the display will indicated 20 ballot scanned, etc.
 14.6.2 	FOLLOWUP (OPEN): What happens if the operator notices that the scanner shows a different count from what they fed through the scanner? The operator would terminate the batch and restart the scan of the batch. Is there any log showing examples of misfeeds or double-feeds? No.

 15 	CLOSED

 16 	CLOSED.

 17 	The following questions relate to the 1% Manual Tally Procedure.
After our meeting, there was some confusion about your intentions in the format of the “1% Manual Tally” report for the current (Nov. 4, 2008) election. We would prefer that you include all discrepancies (and even reports of no discrepancies) for all precincts and all ballot measures, as is done by many other counties in the state.
 17.1 	Q: Do you intend to produce a report that includes this level of detail?
 17.1.1 	Answer: Our December 2, 2008 report does include this level of detail.
 17.1.2 	FOLLOWUP (OPEN): This does not appear to be the case. According to the Secretary of State, in this document: http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/voting_systems/ttbr/pemt_instructions.pdf,
they suggest a form on page three for use in your 1% manual Tally report. It includes the following columns:
	Candidate names – Measure Yes/No
	Machine Tally
	Manual Tally
	Variance
	Reason for Variance
	How was variance resolved?
Such a report would be produced for EACH race in EACH precinct. Therefore,  considering the initial sample of 17 precincts where there are about 20 races on each ballot (an estimate) then we would expect 17x20=340 such reports. Instead, we have a single report for all precincts.

You do not provide those columns in your report, as you include only a single line for each precinct, with the following columns:
	Original Draw(17)
	Seq# & Prec# (these redundantly identify the precinct)
	BT# (Not sure what this is)
	Contestants Tallied (ALL or which races)
	System Count of Ballots Total
	Manual Ballot Total
	Difference in Ballot Count
	Systems Count of Votes Total
	Manual Vote Total
	Difference In Vote Count
	Variances
Unfortunately, the columns you have elected to use will not expose vote-swapping errors, such as if a YES were changed to a NO. The total number of votes would still be the same but the totals for any single race would be different.
---> REQUEST: Please supply a report in the format as specified by the Secretary of State in the document http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/voting_systems/ttbr/pemt_instructions.pdf on page 3. This will result in approximately 20 pages for each precinct sampled (less if all races are not tallied in the manual tally) and so for the first 17 precincts, we would expect about 340 pages in the report. We produce this report in a format acceptable to the Secretary of State, and have provided it to you.  All tally logs are available for inspection.
 17.2 	CLOSED.
 17.3 	CLOSED.
 17.4 	CLOSED.

 18 	CLOSED.

 19 	The following Questions relate to the Reconciliation Procedure.
We have been told that errors detected by the 1% Manual Tally procedure would be caught by the reconciliation procedure.
 19.1 	This procedure is one that we would like to review and is part of our document request (below).
 19.1.1 	Answer: During the 1% manual tally, staff sometimes encounter more ballots or less ballots reported because of an operator error while scanning ballots.
 19.1.2 	FOLLOWUP (OPEN): This answer did not address the question we were attempted to ask, but it is understandable that you may not understand our intent, so please answer the following question. In our recent discussions (and implied by your answer 19.2.1, below) there is a reconciliation procedure of some kind that is different from the 1% manual tally procedure, and is applied to all precincts, even if they were not selected for the 1% manual tally. Included in this reconciliation process is likely the rescanning of selected precincts to check the count of ballots scanned, for example.
---> Please provide the document that defines the reconciliation process, and if such a document does not exist, please explain the process. During the reconciliation of the voted/unvoted/spoiled and provisional ballots for a precinct, the total voted indicated by the poll worker may be different than the calculation of the ballots in the ballot carton.  In this case, canvass personnel will hand count the ballots in the carton and also look for any mail ballots that might have been accidently placed in the ballot box at the polls.  If a mail ballot is found, or if the hand count of the ballots is different than the OS scanner tape indicates, the ballots are submitted for a rerun.
 19.2 	CLOSED

 20 	Document Request. The following documents are requested for review:
 20.1 	CLOSED
 20.2 	Manual Tally Procedure (CLOSED.)
 20.3 	Ballot Order Spreadsheet and Ballot Allocation Policy (CLOSED.)
 20.3.1 	Attachment 2 
 20.3.2 	Review: (Omitted in C00021)
 20.3.3 	FOLLOWUP: Please provide a complete spreadsheet that details the number of ballots allocated to each precinct.
 20.3.4 	ROV: Spreadsheet provided in 2009-02-04 email.
 20.4 	Chain-of-Custody document
 20.4.1 	Attachment 1
 20.4.2 	Review: The document received is entitled “Ballot Inventory” and is apparently completed by each precinct inspector to document the number of blank ballots received. The precinct inspector is requested to remove the seal on the package of blank ballots, count all the ballots, compare with the numbers on the statement, and then mail the statement back to the RoV office. The number of ballots would also be entered on the “Ballot Statement” which is included with the sign-in roster. The ballot packaging would be resealed by the precinct inspector. If a discrepancy is detected by the precinct inspector then they are instructed to call a hotline. Only one such statement was provided as a sample. It is signed by one person, the inspector.
 20.4.3 	FOLLOWUP (OPEN): Were there any discrepancies detected by this process? How many? What was the reason for each one? 
 20.5 	Sign-in Roster 
 20.5.1 	Rosters are available for Review at the Registrar of Voters Office.
 20.5.2 	 (OPEN FOR COPS)
 20.6 	Poll Worker Statement (AKA Ballot Statement)
 20.6.1 	These are on the back of the rosters and available for review.
 20.6.2 	(OPEN FOR COPS)
 20.7 	Collection Center Logs
 20.7.1 	Attachment 4
 20.7.2 	 RECEIVED
 20.7.3 	Review: (Omitted in C00021)
 20.7.4 	Followup: This is not actually a “log” but is a summary report.
---> Do Collection Centers maintain original logs? (A “log” is customarily an exhaustive list of events, even those that are not discrepancies.) The request is for the full set of logs. (Will attempt to view these at our appointment.)
 20.7.5 	ROV: These are available for viewing by calling Darren Neal at 619 694 3403.
 20.7.6 	(OPEN FOR COPS)
 20.8 	Tally Center Log
 20.8.1 	CD to follow by mail.
 20.8.2 	RECEIVED.
 20.8.3 	Review: (Omitted Here)
 20.8.4 	Summary of Seal Problems (Omitted here) 
 20.8.5 	OPEN What is the policy for the allocation of box seals?
Each Precinct inspector (PI) receives 12 blue security seals in their official ballot pouch to seal their ballot cartons after initial inventory, their touchscreen canister, and their ballot cartons when closing the poll.
The PI also receives 4 standard seals in their official ballot pouch to seal the ballot /supply box , after the first voter inspects it to ensure that it is empty.
In Addition, Each collection center was issued five blue seals to be issued to any precint inspectors returning unsealed ballot cartons 

OPEN Is there a report on the inventory of seals, those used and any returned unused?
We keep track of the serialized seals used on the touchscreens (see table) as recorded on the seal verification logs. Currently we do not keep track of the used and returned unused tamper evident blue security seals from polls or collection centers.

Poll worker response	Set up by 7am? y/N 	Tab lock # match? y/N	Green seal match? y/N	Red seal match? y/N	Tamper free? y/N	Signed? (1 or 2  sigs)	Any seals on back? y/N	seals ok or missing red/green/both	Replacement Seal Ver log 	
YES	1224	1599	1631	1591	1536	1567	1672	1659	14	
NO	153	11	8	7	20	71	14	13		
NO RESPONSE	309	76	47	88	130	48		0		
 								14 both seals 		
Not turned in or found in supplies	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11		
Total returned	1686	1686	1686	1686	1686	1686	1686	1686		
GRAND TOTAL	1697	1697	1697	1697	1697	1697	1697	1697		

 20.8.6 	
 20.9 	Batch box label (Used as tracking device when in facility).
 20.9.1 	This is a simple label containing the deck number and the type of ballots in the box. e.g., MAIL, POLLS, PROVISIONAL BALLOTS. No document exists.
 20.9.2 	(OPEN FOR COPS) Will need to inspect the label.
 20.10 	Secure Storage Log (does this exist?)
 20.10.1 	CD to follow by mail.
 20.10.2 	RECEIVED.
 20.10.3 	Review. The document provided is not a log, but an inventory document useful for locating material within secure storage. It does not document specific accesses of the secured material.
 20.10.4 	FOLLOWUP (OPEN): Does the Secure Storage activity track access of secured material, in terms of who, when, why of each access? No log exists.  These storage areas are restricted only to employees who need access.
 20.11 	Audit Log (of central tabulator) See other questions below under item #21. (CLOSED)
 20.12 	For Feb 5 and June 3 Elections (given that you have declined to the request to enhance the 1% manual reports,) the following information is requested for the precincts included in the Manual Tally for each of those elections. This information was requested in the Nov. 20 letter but is repeated here for clarity.
 20.12.1 	Hand tally sheets (CLOSED for Nov 08)
 20.12.2 	Computer reports (CLOSED for Nov 08)
 20.12.3 	Scanner Printout Reports (CLOSED.)
 20.12.4 	Central Tabulator Audit Log CLOSED.
 20.12.5 	Scanner memory cards  CLOSED.
 21 	The following questions are new to C00019 . (OPEN) This first set of questions relate to the Central Tabulator Audit Log files provided per 20.11 and 20.12.4. The detailed examples below are from the Nov. 8 Audit Log.
 21.1 	Do you have full documentation for the audit log, such as what all entries mean and any options or configuration settings in terms of what is provided in the audit log?
NO.
 21.2 	Are there any procedures for review of the log? (i.e. does anyone review the audit log? Who?)
NO. the logs are reviewed by IT staff to verify that an action has take n place such as a batch has been closed and the correct number of cards cast has been captured.

 21.3 	In the first portion of the Audit Log, there are transactions of this format apparently taking about 3.8 minutes for each download. Please explain in detail what is occurring in this process (note: log entries were edited for readability without deleting anything.)
1223283955	Connection Opened                                        on 172.16.1.34 (Port:1025)
1223283958	Downloading   VCenter 10 Machine 0 DLVersion 1 Copy 0    on 172.16.1.34 (Port:1025)
1223284187	Downloaded    VCenter 10 Machine 0 DLVersion 1 Copy 0    on 172.16.1.34 (Port:1025)
1223284187	Connection Closed                                        on 172.16.1.34 (Port:1025)

Election and ballot informaton for Vote Center 1, Touch screen Machine number 0, is being dowloaded for the first tiime into a touch screen memory card that is in a touch screen connected to the gems server over a secured isolated network on IP address 172.xxx.xxx.xxx(port:1025)

 21.4 	 In the second portion of the log, there are transactions of this format apparently taking about 14 seconds for each download. Please explain what is occurring in this process.
1224490723	Connection Opened                                                on COM5
1224490723	Downloading          VCenter 10 Machine 0 DLVersion 1 Copy 0     on COM5
1224490737	Downloaded           VCenter 10 Machine 0 DLVersion 1 Copy 0     on COM5
1224490739	Connection Closed                                                on COM5

Election and ballot information for Vote Center 1, Optical Scan Machine number 0, is being downloaded for the first time into an Optical Scan memory card that isin an optical scanner connected to the gems server on Communications port 5.

 21.5 	In the third portion of the log, there are transactions of this format apparently taking only several seconds to upload. Please explain what is occurring in this process.
1225834962	Connection Opened on COM3
1225834962	Uploading          VCenter 2550 Machine 0 DLVersion 1 Copy 1   on COM3
1225834965	Uploaded           VCenter 2550 Machine 0 DLVersion 1 Copy 1   on COM3 #Cards 113 Precinct  [2550]152410-CLAIREMONT N
1225834968	Connection Closed                                              on COM3
1225834971	Waiting                                                        on COM3

Voted contest counts for the ballot type at vote center 255, from machine number 0, from the 2nd copy of that card, which is in an optical scanner being read on COM 3 by the gems server, for this election on this optical scan card recorded 113 ballot cards passed through the scanner at precinct (vote center) 255 precinct number 152410, location Clairemont N.

 21.6 	There are also a few (two) cases of transactions of the following form. Please explain what is occurring in this process.

1225838065	Connection Opened                                    on 172.16.1.20 (Port:1027)
1225838074	Uploaded VCenter 17000 Machine 1 DLVersion 1 Copy 0  on 172.16.1.20 (Port:1027) SN 223582 #Ballots 12 12 Precincts
1225838074	Connection Closed                                    on 172.16.1.20 (Port:1027)

1225838148	Connection Opened                                   on 172.16.1.20 (Port:1029)
1225838160	Uploaded VCenter 17000 Machine 0 DLVersion 1 Copy 0 on 172.16.1.20 (Port:1029) SN 208790 #Ballots 20 18 Precincts
1225838160	Connection Closed                                   on 172.16.1.20 (Port:1029)

Voted contest counts for the ballot types at vote center 1700 (early voting location at RoV office), from machine number 1, from the 1st copy of that touch screen card, which is being read from a touch screeen connected to the gems server over a secured isolated network on IP address 172.xxx.xxx.xxx (paort: 1027) SN 223582. Precincts.

 21.7 	In numerous places throughout the log, we see the transactions for starting and stopping the server. For example, at the start of the log, we see:
1223283632	Starting AV Server
However, in numerous places (ten), there is no notation that the server was stopped and it is started, or it is started and there is no “Stopping” entry. In addition, during those intervals, there is significant time elapsed in the unaccounted time period. For example, 

1224517959	Connection Closed on COM3
1224517962	Waiting on COM3
1224518202	Starting AV Server  (NOTE NO “STOPPING SERVER”)

1224519519	Stopping AV Server
1224571786	Waiting on COM3     (NOTE NO “STARTING SERVER”)
1224571786	Waiting on COM2

1224586245	Waiting on COM8
1224587341	Starting AV Server  (NOTE NO “STOPPING SERVER”)

1225728881	Waiting on COM1
1225729028	Waiting on COM1
1225817009	Starting AV Server  (NOTE NO “STOPPING SERVER”)

1225837932	Waiting on COM2
1225838035	Starting AV Server  (NOTE NO “STOPPING SERVER”)

1223564989	Stopping AV Server
1224490449	Waiting on COM5     (NOTE NO “STARTING SERVER”)
1224490449	Waiting on COM3

1224519519	Stopping AV Server
1224571786	Waiting on COM3     (NOTE NO “STARTING SERVER”)
1224571786	Waiting on COM2

1225708019	Stopping AV Server
1225712288	Waiting on COM1     (NOTE NO “STARTING SERVER”)
1225712411	Connection Opened on COM1

1225817574	Waiting on COM1
1225817579	Stopping AV Server
1225819478	Waiting on COM1     (NOTE NO “STARTING SERVER”)
1225819489	Waiting on COM2

1228227206	Connection Closed on COM8
1228227210	Waiting on COM8
(END OF THE LOG)                (NOTE NO “STOPPING SERVER”)
This question assumes an order of processing that is erroneous. As stated above, the AV Server Log is a continuous log file that contains events.
Events happen before the AV server is started.
Events happen while the AV server is running.
Events happen after the AV server is stopped.

 21.7.1 	Why does the log have this inconsistency?

Because it is an Event driven log file.  The events themselves can be driven by a myriad of other varying events.
 21.7.2 	It is possible that some transactions have been deleted from the log, when the central tabulator was still running, and then shut down later, with the “Stopping AV Server” also deleted?
We are unable to answer this.  Perhaps Premier could answer it.
 21.7.3 	Are there other missing log entries? It would be helpful if each log entry were numbered consecutively so we could tell if any entries were deleted. Without such numbering, how do we know if the log was simply edited by any unscrupulous worker with access to the log?
The AV server log file is a continuous log file of Events and not a report.  The events are noted by timestamp of occurrence.

 21.7.4 	In general, how is this log immune to modification by a worker?

Access to all GEMS files is by designated Election Officials only.  Since the log files are output files only, and not needed in subsequent operations in the election tabulation or reporting, it is a simple txt file.

 21.8 	There is an internal error noted in the log:
1225838402	Error Internal Error
File: DownloadAVSPort.cpp, Line 665, Date: May 13 2005 on COM8

This error is internal to the GEMS software.  Premier would need to answer this question.
 21.8.1 	What was the nature of this error?

The log file does not state the nature of the error.
 21.8.2 	Was this error noted in any operator notes?

It is noted in the log file.
 21.8.3 	 Why is the date “May 13, 2005” noted when the timestamp (1225838402) resolves to 2008-11-04:14:40:02 (2:40pm on Nov. 4)?

That is incorrect.  The timestamp does not resolve to 2008-11-04:14:40:02.
 21.8.4 	Please provide the source to the file DownloadAVSPort.cpp So that we may conduct an independent analysis of this error.
Please direct this request to Premier.

 21.9 	There is an error noted several times in the log:

	1225840804	Error "   WRONG MODE" on COM2

 21.9.1 	What does this mean?

It means that an optical scan card had not been closed and will not upload to the server.
 21.9.2 	Was this error noted in any operator notes?

It is noted in the log file.

 21.10 	There is an internal error noted in the log:

1225840829	Error Internal Error

 21.10.1 	What was the nature of this error?

An internal error occurred while uploading VCenter 1568.  It tried again at Timestamp 1225840856 and was successful..  The log file does not state the nature of the error.
 21.10.2 	Was this error noted in any operator notes?

It is noted in the log file.
 21.11 	There is an unusual situation noted by these entries:
	1225842274	Connection Opened on COM2
1225842274	Uploading VCenter 0 Machine -65 DLVersion 1 Copy 0 on COM2
1225842274	Error Unknown Memory Card on COM2

 21.11.1 	What was the nature of this error?

The optical scan card was defective and was not uploaded.  In cases like this, we re-run that specific precinct.  
 21.11.2 	Was this error noted in any operator notes?

It is noted in the log file

 21.12 	There is an invalid password noted as well:
	1225850242	Connection Opened on COM2
1225850242	Error "INVALID PASSWORD" on COM2
1225850244	Connection Closed on COM2

 21.12.1 	Please explain what probably happened here.

We are unable to explain this.  Please redirect your question to Premier.

 21.12.2 	Was this error noted in any operator notes?

It is noted in the log file.

 21.13 	There are a number of times (133 total) where the totals were cleared and the precinct re-run, starting Nov. 20 and occurring through Dec. 2, 2008, as listed below.

1227198273	Clearing VCenter 5890:0
1227198287	Clearing VCenter 14660:0
1227198295	Clearing VCenter 14810:0
1227198304	Clearing VCenter 14840:0
1227198313	Clearing VCenter 14860:0
1227198320	Clearing VCenter 14870:0
1227198331	Clearing VCenter 14940:0
1227198351	Clearing VCenter 14970:0
1227198361	Clearing VCenter 15040:0
1227198367	Clearing VCenter 15100:0
1227198377	Clearing VCenter 15120:0
1227198386	Clearing VCenter 15130:0
1227198394	Clearing VCenter 15240:0
1227198407	Clearing VCenter 15530:0
1227198417	Clearing VCenter 15590:0
1227198431	Clearing VCenter 14670:0
1227198444	Clearing VCenter 14930:0
1227198462	Clearing VCenter 15620:0
1227198475	Clearing VCenter 15670:0
1227198495	Clearing VCenter 15080:0
1227198514	Clearing VCenter 15500:0
1227254559	Clearing VCenter 14660:0
1227254630	Clearing VCenter 140:0
1227254644	Clearing VCenter 1020:0
1227254668	Clearing VCenter 15120:0
1227254757	Clearing VCenter 1410:0
1227254791	Clearing VCenter 15100:0
1227256231	Clearing VCenter 600:0
1227279566	Clearing VCenter 2160:0
1227279577	Clearing VCenter 2620:0
1227279593	Clearing VCenter 3280:0
1227279601	Clearing VCenter 3320:0
1227279618	Clearing VCenter 2170:0
1227279632	Clearing VCenter 14250:0
1227279644	Clearing VCenter 15070:0
1227279667	Clearing VCenter 9740:0
1227280626	Clearing VCenter 3160:0
1227369994	Clearing VCenter 1150:0
1227370008	Clearing VCenter 3750:0
1227370019	Clearing VCenter 3800:0
1227370025	Clearing VCenter 3880:0
1227370036	Clearing VCenter 4170:0
1227370049	Clearing VCenter 5600:0
1227631418	Clearing VCenter 11500:0
1227631433	Clearing VCenter 10840:0
1227631449	Clearing VCenter 7590:0
1227631463	Clearing VCenter 820:0
1227631477	Clearing VCenter 7300:0
1227631489	Clearing VCenter 10610:0
1227631504	Clearing VCenter 600:0
1227631517	Clearing VCenter 9470:0
1227631531	Clearing VCenter 9990:0
1227631542	Clearing VCenter 9310:0
1227631556	Clearing VCenter 9950:0
1227631585	Clearing VCenter 8120:0
1227631603	Clearing VCenter 9870:0
1227631619	Clearing VCenter 3280:0
1227631631	Clearing VCenter 9270:0
1227631644	Clearing VCenter 6550:0
1227631655	Clearing VCenter 7010:0
1227707441	Clearing VCenter 13080:0
1227707452	Clearing VCenter 13430:0
1227707467	Clearing VCenter 11810:0
1227707483	Clearing VCenter 12910:0
1227707499	Clearing VCenter 13720:0
1227707513	Clearing VCenter 12050:0
1227707544	Clearing VCenter 12670:0
1227707576	Clearing VCenter 12590:0
1227707594	Clearing VCenter 12730:0
1227707615	Clearing VCenter 12520:0
1227707657	Clearing VCenter 9270:0
1227707676	Clearing VCenter 800:0
1227707946	Clearing VCenter 12260:0
1227707958	Clearing VCenter 10430:0
1227707965	Clearing VCenter 10470:0
1227711151	Clearing VCenter 14920:0
1227711219	Clearing VCenter 11160:0
1227711245	Clearing VCenter 13590:0
1227711271	Clearing VCenter 15320:0
1227882056	Clearing VCenter 4040:0
1227882076	Clearing VCenter 2650:0
1227882092	Clearing VCenter 1310:0
1227882113	Clearing VCenter 14590:0
1227882125	Clearing VCenter 14540:0
1227882141	Clearing VCenter 660:0
1227882154	Clearing VCenter 370:0
1227882171	Clearing VCenter 16150:0
1227882195	Clearing VCenter 15880:0
1227882231	Clearing VCenter 16620:0
1227882245	Clearing VCenter 16670:0
1227882258	Clearing VCenter 16570:0
1227882271	Clearing VCenter 16430:0
1227882304	Clearing VCenter 13390:0
1227882326	Clearing VCenter 16720:0
1227883980	Clearing VCenter 2900:0
1227883995	Clearing VCenter 2690:0
1227884821	Clearing VCenter 1730:0
1227972685	Clearing VCenter 8340:0
1227972700	Clearing VCenter 7110:0
1227972776	Clearing VCenter 5530:0
1227972789	Clearing VCenter 8520:0
1227972798	Clearing VCenter 8510:0
1227972811	Clearing VCenter 8060:0
1227972830	Clearing VCenter 8040:0
1227972862	Clearing VCenter 11340:0
1227972936	Clearing VCenter 7250:0
1227972985	Clearing VCenter 3090:0
1227973010	Clearing VCenter 4130:0
1227973139	Clearing VCenter 16470:0
1227973181	Clearing VCenter 4980:0
1228148770	Clearing VCenter 16230:0
1228148788	Clearing VCenter 12150:0
1228148805	Clearing VCenter 10390:0
1228148851	Clearing VCenter 8180:0
1228148879	Clearing VCenter 15910:0
1228148902	Clearing VCenter 10880:0
1228148916	Clearing VCenter 1110:0
1228148937	Clearing VCenter 16100:0
1228148951	Clearing VCenter 15710:0
1228148970	Clearing VCenter 13960:0
1228148986	Clearing VCenter 9130:0
1228149011	Clearing VCenter 6990:0
1228149023	Clearing VCenter 6980:0
1228149099	Clearing VCenter 3210:0
1228220582	Clearing VCenter 4960:0
1228220601	Clearing VCenter 1870:0
1228220618	Clearing VCenter 3700:0
1228220643	Clearing VCenter 4620:0
1228220657	Clearing VCenter 10880:0
1228220671	Clearing VCenter 11660:0
1228220684	Clearing VCenter 350:0
1228227151	Clearing VCenter 7770:0
1228227169	Clearing VCenter 8230:0

 21.13.1 	It is our hope that you have documented the reason for each time these were re-run, so it will be a simple matter for us to obtain the rationale for re-running each one of these precincts without incurring a great deal of work on your part. What prompted the re-running of the precincts (please specify for each re-run occurrence) ? Please see our response at 19.1.2.
 21.13.2 	Was there any differences in the totals between the earlier run and the final run?

Ballots are rerun for several reasons.  There may have been an operator error that allowed one ballot to be entered into the system twice or one that was missed because the system displayed an error that was not caught during processing.  There may have been a mail ballot in the deck of polls ballots, which would also require a rerun to remove the ballots.

 21.13.3 	We did not notice any “Clearing Vcenter” entries prior to the initial accumulation of votes. How do we know that the accumulators were zeroed? If the log includes such an entry at an earlier date, please forward the complete log, including the clearing entry(ies).
The initial system is cleared at the beginning of the mail ballot processing, at which time a zero ballots cast report is run.  From this point forward, ballots are added to the system.  It should be noted that the “clearing Vcenter” entry is for an OS memory card that is used to transfer ballots cast at the polling places (contained in ballot cartons) into GEMS on election night and during the canvass as reruns.

 22 	Ballot Information Files – To allow a scanner to extract the vote from a paper ballot, we understand that it is standard practice to generate files that describe the location and meaning of each bubble on the ballot, (and for sake of definition, we are referring to these files as “Ballot Information Files.”)
 22.1 	Please confirm that you use such files to allow the scanners to extract the vote from the ballots. If not, please describe the method you use.
There are files (actually reports) that identify the districts to contests but none that identify the location of bubbles on the ballots.  These reports are used in the proofing phase to verify that the correct contests and candidates are associated with the correct ballot styles.  Actual pre-marked ballots are used to verify that marked bubbles are counted correctly as votes for the contests and candidates.  This is done during logic testing. 

 22.2 	Please describe how these files are generated and validated (tested) to insure that they accurately describe the (many) ballots in use.
Test ballots are printed using the GEMS system along with administrative reports.  These are used by our Campaign Services section along with other reports generated by our election management system, DIMS, to verify the ballots contain the correct contests, candidates and that candidate rotation has been applied properly to the correct ballot styles.  After this process is complete, test ballots are produced with voting patterns which are run during the logic tests to verify the system is tallying properly.

 22.3 	Please provide the ballot information files for our analysis in electronic form. 
The electronic versions are either paper or PDF images of the ballots.  There will be a cost to produce these.  We estimate 1 hour to assemble the PDF in Technical Services, and several hours for Campaign Services to scan the documents they use in the proofing phase. Please let us know how you wish to proceed.

 23 	Operator Notes and other reports – We have noted the need to check log inconsistencies, re-runs, and the like with operator notes.
 23.1 	What sort of operator notes are maintained during any and all processes?
None pertaining to reruns.
 23.2 	Are there any other notes and reports we can refer to in an effort to review your procedures?
None that we are aware of. 

 24 	 NEW TECHNICAL REQUEST (From 2009-02-02 Email): PRECINCT SEQUENCE NUMS:
In the official canvass release (database files) we were unable to find the file that relates the internal precinct sequence number (1-1650) with the "precinct" ranging from 100000 to 704120, (6062 unique values) and "default_consolidation" (751 unique values from105000 to  999999, plus 0 and -12541). The field "precinct_id" in the precdist table is not the sequence number being used by your office, and ranges from 8 to 13,447, (6062 unique values) with many values skipped. Please explain how we may determine the relationship between precinct and seq# (as found on scanner tape envelopes) from the files given or provide an additional file. (It is our opinion that this file should be part of the canvass released by your office.) The ballot order spreadsheet provided in the Feb. 4 email shows the relationship between precinct numbers and sequence numbers.

To reduce the use of paper products, we would be happy to accept the information as scanned documents in PDF, JPG or a similar format. Since there is no cost in the form of paper and toner to create these files, we anticipate that the cost will therefore be minimal. If you need any help in creating such scanned files, we would be happy to assist your staff so that the cost for compliance can be minimized, as we are well aware of the tight budget situation. (We would be happy to set up scanners in your secure facility so we these documents can be scanned and made available to the public.)

Please consider the above request for reports to be covered under the California Public Records Act, and comply within ten days. However, we acknowledge that our request exceeds the minimum requirements of the CPRA and that there is no legal requirement that you must decline to answer these questions, and therefore in the spirit of assisting us with our review, we therefore request that you answer our questions. We will attempt to avoid any questions that are not designed to elucidate your process.

We would appreciate a prompt reply to this request to confirm your cooperation. The best way to respond is by email. We do not require any follow-up by conventional mail for our records as we will actively confirm your communication.

We trust that you will receive these requests with the community spirit that they are intended.

Sincerely,

Raymond Lutz
Coordinator, Citizens’ Oversight Projects (COPs)